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Russia’s Energy Diplomacy in the 
Baltic States
by Zachary Hanson
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, or, “The Baltic States,” are unique in 
that they are the first and only former Soviet Republics to join institutions 
aligned with the West, joining both the European Union (EU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. This move was a 
reflection of clashing cultural and political values that had been present be-
fore their integration into the Soviet Union during the Second World War 
as a result of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. 
Additionally, after years of Soviet repression, the Baltic States developed a 
distinctly anti-Russian stance, as Russia was the most dominant country of 
the Soviet Union and after its dissolution in 1991 (Dudzińska, 2011). In the 
two decades since the Soviet Union fell and the Baltic States gained their 
independence, Russia has been asserting both soft and hard power in near-
by nations. Additionally, Russia’s energy policy towards their neighbors 
has significantly affected their relationship with European Union countries 
through their role as the primary supplier of natural gas.
According to Dudzinska (2011), the Baltic States were a unified force 
leading up to their independence. They were the first republics to take 
advantage of the apparently weakened Soviet state. Starting in 1987, pro-
tests spread throughout Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, at which patriotic 
songs taken from folklore were sung. These protests came to be a symbolic 
head when a massive protest was held in 1989, in which millions of peo-
ple linked arms connecting the capital cities of Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. 
This event, held on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact, would eventually be known as the Baltic chain. Later, in 1990, Lith-
uania declared their independence, soon to be followed by Latvia and 
Estonia, though it was not recognized until the Soviet Union was officially 
dissolved in December 1991. Estonia was the first of the Baltic countries 
invited to discussions involving their EU ascension, followed by Latvia 
and Lithuania in 1998. Although not traditionally a significant force in 
Western European politics, a variety of aspects began to take route that 
provided for the ascension of the Baltic countries to the European Union. 
According to Made (2002), the factors that allowed for the inclusion of 
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the Baltic States to the European Union were increased Nordic interest in 
the area, the relatively strong performance of their small economies, and 
a policy of the Russian government to not interfere with the Western gov-
ernments, as they were still heavily dependent on them for aid.
Similar to the way Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia sought to follow their 
own path in 1991, Russia was also searching for their national identity af-
ter gaining independence. Russia was unable to become a dominant figure 
in the international scene for several years because of reforms that did not 
immediately create an environment conducive to a market economy. In 
the last decade, Russia has transformed from a relatively weak, democratic 
country to an authoritarian country characterized by its strength in energy 
policy. However, despite the widely held belief that Putin singlehandedly 
brought Russia out of its depression, it is far more likely he benefitted from 
“being in the right place at the right time” (Aslund, 2008). According to 
Aslund (2008), Putin’s reforms came at a time when the Russian economy 
was already improving due to earlier reforms in the Yeltsin administra-
tion as well as the increase in the price of oil. Russia holds the distinction 
of having the world’s largest reserves in natural gas, the second largest 
coal reserves, and the seventh largest oil reserves. Since 2009, they have 
occasionally overtaken Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer 
(Lough, 2011).
According to Lough (2011), Russia benefitted from the overall rise in 
the price of oil from $18 per barrel in 1999, when Putin was elected pres-
ident, to nearly $148 per barrel, just before the global financial crisis. In 
the last decade, not only has Russia been able to solve many of its internal 
problems, but it has risen again as one of the world’s strongest nations. 
Putin has shown himself to be one of the most educated world leaders in 
the areas of foreign policy and energy policy and has shown considerable 
skill in integrating Russia’s natural resources with his ability to personally 
influence other leaders (Lough, 2011). 
The inclusion of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to the EU and NATO 
significantly reduced Russia’s ability to influence these countries’ domes-
tic policies, which have been a source of concern for Moscow (Grigas, 
2012, p. 2). This strategy is determined through national interest, which 
is in turn determined by self-sufficiency and security. In other words, it is 
not necessarily bad that Russia is trying to influence its neighbors, as it is 
only natural for them to seek ways to ensure the stability of their country 
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through the creation of networks to serve their business interests, create a 
sense of national unity by underlining threats from the near abroad, and 
create a way to compete with the leading countries of the world: the Unit-
ed States, France, England, Germany, and Japan (Laurila, 2003, p. 28). 
However, their methods for regaining influence in their traditional sphere 
should be a cause for alarm for the governments of Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Latvia (Grigas, 2012). According to Grigas (2012, p. 2), “Russian in-
fluence in the Baltics aims to constrain their independence and undermine 
the political, economic, and civilizational choices they have made.” Rus-
sia’s tactics to gain influence in the Baltic region are often covert and coer-
cive and seek to combine their hard power, through their role as principal 
energy supplier, and soft power, through extensive networks of ethnic 
Russians living in the Baltics and Kremlin-loyal public sphere and private 
sphere figures. However, despite Russia’s ability to use their foreign policy 
to gain influence, it would not be possible without conditions within the 
Baltic countries that make them vulnerable to Russian influence. This pa-
per will first discuss the political conditions that allow Russia to influence 
Baltic policy: the fragmentation and commercialization of policy, as well as 
the large minority of ethnic Russians living there. The paper will then dis-
cuss the lack of energy resources in these countries that have made them 
energy-dependent on Russia for oil, gas, and nuclear power. 
The success of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in their transformation 
to apparently democratic states with a market economy has been prevent-
ed to a full transition by a political system characterized by fragmenta-
tion, commercialization of politics, and a large minority of ethnic Russians 
(Grigas, 2012). These weaknesses create corruption and open the door to 
Russia’s ability to influence their politics, as well as their ability to create 
networks of ethnic Russians that can ultimately threaten the home-rule of 
the Baltic States. According to Geddes, fragmentation caused by the party 
system limits a legislature’s “ability to pursue its own aggrandizement at 
the expense of the presidency and contribute to the accretion of presiden-
tial powers” (Meleshevich, 2007, p. 146). 
Estonia has become associated with the most positive image of a post-So-
viet successor state and has led their fellow Baltic States in their transition 
to democracy. One way they have built this image has been through their 
ability to limit fragmentation. Estonia was the first among the former Sovi-
et republics to reject the Soviet political structure they inherited and have 
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the most “consistent and coherent policy” (Meleshevich, 2007, p. 187) in 
regards to party structure. One 1994 law raised the minimum membership 
for a party from 200 to 1,000 (Meleshevich, 2007). On the other hand, 
Latvia and Lithuania have been less successful in preventing fragmented 
governments, though Latvia has been considerably less so since the late 
2000s (Grigas, 2012). While the Baltic countries may not be significantly 
more fragmented than other Western European governments, other fac-
tors, including a lack of professionalism, low standards of responsibility 
and accountability, and poor institutional framework in both the private 
and public spheres, make third parties particularly susceptible to degrees 
of Russian influence. Additionally, the fragile nature of new countries 
tends to make it easier for Russia to influence these countries. According 
to Meleshevich (2007), the Pederson Index, which indicates the degree of 
electoral stability in a party system, shows that Estonia currently has the 
highest level of party stability among the Baltic countries. 
The commercialization of politics, or the increased ability for business-
es to penetrate government and to influence its policies, is another source 
of concern for the Baltic States. It occurs when businesses lobby govern-
ments to create policies that are favorable to Russian interests. It not only 
includes Russian businesses that have invested in these countries, but also 
local businesses that export and import goods to and from Russia. The 
Baltic States are particularly vulnerable to the commercialization of politics 
because they are new states with small economies and are highly depen-
dent on Russia for natural resources (Grigas, 2012). One way that Russia 
has exploited this weakness is by exporting Russian business culture to 
the Baltics and creating networks of ethnic Russians by encouraging them 
to become active in the public and private spheres. Russia has employed 
a number of soft power tactics to capitalize on Baltic governments’ sus-
ceptibility to be influenced by commercial means. Ways that Russia has 
done this include lobbying from pro-Russian businesses and encouraging 
a non-transparent political structure.
Finally, a third political factor that limits the Baltic States’ ability to ad-
vance is their large minority of ethnic Russians, especially in Estonia and 
Latvia, where they make up more than 30% of the population. At first, 
this was not a large problem because few were involved in the political 
process. Of the ethnic Russians living in Estonia and Latvia, only 15% 
had been granted citizenship. However, near the close of the last decade, 
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especially in Latvia, ethnic Russians began to make a larger impact in pol-
itics. For example, the Harmony Centre, a political party that represented 
the Russian minority came in first place in the number of votes collected. 
Estonia’s Centre party has also gained significant in-roads in the political 
spectrum, as it is currently the largest party representing Russian minori-
ty interests (Grigas, 2012). This is a striking turn of events for the Baltic 
governments, as Russian minority participation is increasing, as well as the 
efforts of the Russian government from abroad to protect the interests of 
ethnic Russians. 
In addition to the poor political framework that characterizes the Baltic 
governments, Russia lacks energy resources, which limits their ability to 
influence politics and business. However, the Baltic States are at least par-
tially to blame for their situation because of failed attempts resulting from 
political inadequacies to become more energy independent. Together, all 
three countries are 90% dependent on Russia for oil and nearly 100% for 
gas (Grigas, 2012). However, Estonia is less dependent on Russia’s oil 
because they have been able to develop Baltic Shale as a viable alternative 
for energy. In 2006, a report by European Academies (Francu, Harvie, 
Laenen, Siirde, Veiderma, Collins, & Steiger, 2007), found that Estonian 
shale oil provides 55% of Estonia’s total power consumption. Today, shale 
oil is considered Estonia’s most valuable natural resource, perhaps because 
it gives it leverage against Russia’s ability to exert hard power (Francu et 
al., 2007). Estonia’s membership in the EU may have been detrimental 
to their ability to becoming fully energy independent. Under a law im-
posed by the European Union, Estonia is required to change their current 
ash disposal method to a newer, yet more costly environmentally friend-
ly method (Francu et al., 2007). Currently, the Estonian parliament has 
been looking into new ways to provide a degree of energy independency, 
including new technologies and methods that would enable an effective 
manner of   oil shale production. Still, Estonia is the exception to the rule, 
as Latvia and Lithuania do not have enough energy resources to become 
energy independent. As of 2010, Lithuania and Latvia import almost 50% 
of the energy that they consume, whereas Estonia imports less than 10% 
(Barrientos & Soria, 2011). Lithuania has been involved in mining for oil 
since 1958 and currently has 400 wells and 19 oil fields. Though Lithua-
nia is able to extract a small level of oil domestically, albeit at a very small 
level, it is mostly dependent on oil imports (Pasukeviciute & Roe, 2005). 
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Latvia, however, has decreased their energy imports by nearly 40% since 
they gained their independence, though they also are heavily dependent 
on outside sources for energy (Barrientos & Soria, 2011). While the Baltic 
States may be at least partially independent of Russia for oil through their 
ability to import trade through terminals on the Baltic Sea, they are almost 
completely dependent on Russia for natural gas (Grigas, 2012). They are 
dependent on Russia for gas because they lack the resources to produce it 
domestically and are linked only to Russia from pipelines built during the 
Soviet Union. 
In order for Latvia and Lithuania to become independent of Russian 
influence imposed through the latter’s energy policy, they must find a way 
to become more integrated into the European market. According to Mai-
gre (2010), the Baltic countries are currently only linked with Russia and 
Belarus through the existing infrastructure of oil pipelines and electric and 
gas grids inherited from the Soviet Union. They are neither linked to the 
Western European electric grid (UTCE), nor the Scandinavian grid (Nor-
del). The Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) is currently 
the most significant effort to bring Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the 
European electric grid. The first phase of this plan hopes to connect Esto-
nia and Finland through a second electricity cable, called Estlink 2, which 
is supposed to supplement the first electricity cable, Estlink 1, by collective-
ly delivering 1000 MW. Another part of the plan hopes to build a connec-
tion between Latvia and Sweden. Finally, the third part of the plan hopes 
to connect Lithuania and Poland.  The success of these projects has not 
been guaranteed;   corruption, a lack of political transparency, , and other 
economic and technical problems has led to the failure of these projects, 
particularly the link between Lithuania and Poland. According to Maigre 
(2010), one reason for the lack of progress linking Lithuania and Poland is 
the lack of “political will” on either side to move ahead.
In addition to plans of building an integrated power grid, the European 
Union also seeks to connect the Baltic States via new gas pipelines that 
would help them become independent of the old Soviet-era infrastructure. 
However, plans to create gas pipelines also seem to be stalling. A plan 
that seeks to build a connection between Estonia, Latvia, and Finland, 
called the BalticConnector, has faced considerable difficulties, making the 
process move forward very slowly. The biggest reason why this plan has 
not yet been implemented is that it is believed that the source of Latvia’s 
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gas reservoirs being Russian in origin will not contribute to the diversifi-
cation of the market. Another reason for the slow movement in finalizing 
this project is that Gazprom, a private company, in which the Russian 
government is the largest shareholder, controls a majority of Finnish and 
Estonian gas companies, making the feasibility of the politically reality of 
this project very low (Maigre, 2010). 
However, despite the political problems that the Baltic countries still 
have and Russia’s ability to increase its “political power… and internation-
al prestige” (Lough, 2011, p. 2), the biggest reason for Russian influence 
in the Baltics has been a shift in foreign policy based on nuclear weapons 
to capitalizing on their vast energy reserves. During the Soviet Union, it 
would have been unthinkable to use oil and gas reserves to maintain influ-
ence throughout the communist world because it would have destroyed 
their economy, which was already based off the production of nuclear 
weapons. It would have also destroyed the Cold War security structure 
that was also based off the threat of nuclear weapons (Lough, 2011). How-
ever, following the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has become the inher-
itor of a majority of the former’s natural resource wealth. Several other 
countries that were formerly republics of the Soviet Union also have sig-
nificant reserves, most notably Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Armenia, and Turk-
menistan, but they lack the infrastructure and financial capital, that Russia 
also inherited from the Soviet Union, to export oil and gas to Western 
Europe and North America (Wood, 2012). 
In addition to the structural weaknesses and resource deficient nations 
of the Baltic region, Russia has also used hard power and soft tactics to 
influence their neighbors’ domestic and economic policy. According to 
Grigas (2012), there are three ways that Russia has used hard power in 
the energy sector as a means of influence: oil sanctions, gas isolation, and 
nuclear energy. While Russia uses various different methods to display 
their hard power in the energy sector, they use a variety of different subtle 
tactics, such as creating networks and diplomacy, to conceal the nature of 
the more overt methods (Grigas, 2012). 
Russia has used the energy sector as a source for their hard power 
through oil sanctions. According to Grigas (2012), Russia cut off oil ex-
ports around 40 times to its neighbor, mostly to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and the Baltic 
States. The most recent examples of Russia cutting of energy exports to 
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the Baltics occurred at Ventspils Nafta (VN), Mažeikiu Nafta (MN), and 
all rail transit to Estonia briefly in 2007. The MN incident, which occurred 
in 2006 in Lithuania, is a clear indicator of the extent that the Russian State 
is willing to go to punish a state not acting in line with its interests. Russian 
authorities claimed that the pipeline was experiencing technical difficulties, 
although they were reported shortly after the finalization of a sale of the 
MN refinery from Yukos, a Russian company, to PKN Orlen, a Polish 
company. According to Trenin (2008), Russia’s behavior was punitive as 
Lithuania authorized the sale to the Polish company, instead of Russia’s 
choice, Lukoil. However, Lithuania has been able to resist the efforts by 
Moscow, and have not yet backed down (Grigas, 2012).
A similar incident occurred in Latvia during the privatization of the 
Latvian Port Authority Ventspils Nafta in 2003, when  the Latvian gov-
ernment resisted investment attempts by Russian companies, including 
Transneft and Lukoil. In response, the angered Russian authorities simply 
cut of the supply of oil to this plant. Latvian authorities, however, also 
refused to back down, and to this day, Russian oil does not come to this 
port (Grigas, 2012). 
In May 2007 in Estonia, protestors tore down a monument commemo-
rating the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War Two. This event 
occurred just days before Russia’s national holiday and greatly angered 
the Russian government. In response, they cut off all energy exports to 
the country by rail. In contrast to the incidents that occurred in Latvia and 
Lithuania, the May 2007 halt in energy exports to Estonia was more of an 
attempt to alter public policy, rather than an attempt to protect economic 
interests. In addition to cutting off exports to this region, it is believed that 
Moscow organized and supported several riots and cyber-attacks against 
Estonian websites in the ensuing weeks However, following many months 
of negotiations between Estonian and Russian leaders, oil exports were 
returned to pre-crisis levels (Grigas, 2012). 
In the case of oil, the Russian government built the Baltic Pipeline Sys-
tem (BPS), completed in 2001, to bypass the Baltic States to reach Western 
Europe. The BPS has given Russia a considerable advantage by allowing 
Russia to cut the supply oil to the Baltics without threatening the supply to 
Western Europe. However oil sanctions do not threaten the Baltic econ-
omies. In contrast to oil sanctions, Russia’s use of gas isolation is much 
more effective. While the Estonians are able to use shale oil to act as a 
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replacement to traditional oil, and all three countries’ ability to import 
oil from other sources, all three countries do not have a viable source of 
gas, so they are wholly dependent on the pre-independence gas grids built 
during the Soviet Union. Additionally, Russia is not as dependent on the 
Baltic States for the transfer of gas as they are for oil.  According to Grigas 
(2012), there are four reasons why Russia does halt the transfer of gas to 
these countries:
1. Many Russian businesses hold a controlling share in the three larg-
est gas companies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Eesti Gaas, 
Latvijas Gaze and Lietuvos Dujos)
2. There are many local providers loyal to Moscow, which can be used 
to lobby the Baltic governments as a means of soft power.
3. Russia can force the Baltic countries to pay full price.
4. By stopping gas from going to Latvia and Lithuania, Russia is pre-
venting the transfer of gas to its enclave, Kalingrad, located on the 
Baltic Sea (Grigas, 2012).
One policy in particular that Russia has sought to influence in the Baltic 
countries is their support of the EU’s Third European Energy Package, 
which calls for the unbundling of the transfer service and the distribution 
system. If implemented, this would protect Baltic interests by increasing 
competition in the area. The Russian response has resisted on a stipulation 
in the law that allows each country to adopt its own “unbundling pack-
age.” For example, Lithuania has adopted a policy that can significantly 
reduce Russian influence in the gas sector by requiring that the sale of 
transfer systems in the power grid go to someone not associated with the 
power company. In response, Russia has threatened Lithuania with higher 
gas prices. However, as of May 2012, they have failed to alter the course 
the Lithuanian government has chosen.
In contrast, the Latvian and Estonian governments have requested 
an exemption that would last until 2014. In the meantime, they decided 
to unbundle using the least stringent package. Grigas (2012) speculated 
that through networks of ethnic Russians and local companies loyal to 
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Moscow, Russian soft power has affected their ability to make a decision 
truly reflective of national interests.  For example, “insiders in the Latvi-
an government believe Latvijas Gaze together with the largest Latvian 
consumer of Russian gas, the national electricity producer Latvenergo, 
played a significant role in the government’s energy policy and position on 
unbundling” (Grigas, 2012, p. 7). As a reward to creating policies in line 
with their expectations, the state-controlled Gazprom gave gas discounts 
to Estonia and Latvia in response to their support of the least stringent 
unbundling package (Grigas, 2012). 
Kalingrad is an enclave of the Russian Federation, separated from Rus-
sia by Lithuania and Latvia. This gives Lithuania a small advantage be-
cause any cut in the gas supply would mean a cut in supply to Kalingrad. 
However, since the early 2000s, Moscow has been planning to build a gas 
pipeline from Russia to Germany, called the Nord Stream, which would 
completely bypass the Baltic countries. The construction of a second pipe-
line off of the main one to Kalingrad would allow Russia to cut off gas 
exports to Lithuania without consequence. 
A third way Russia has achieved a manner of hard power in the Baltic 
States is in their superiority of nuclear power. Although there has been an 
attempt to build the nuclear industry in Lithuania, the project is unlikely to 
be finalized because of the apprehension of German and French investors 
to invest in a region that they do not deem profitable. Grigas (2012) be-
lieves that the investors may have been dissuaded from bidding by Putin’s 
efforts to attract them to invest in a Russian nuclear power plant in Kalin-
grad. According to Klevas & Antinucci (2004), the issue of nuclear power 
is very important, especially to the Baltic States. Klevas and Antinucci 
(2004) believe that because nuclear power can be used as a renewable re-
source, it is much more valuable to European investors. However, because 
it is valuable, the investors are more likely to invest with Russian projects 
because they have shown more experience than their Baltic counterparts 
(Klevas & Antinucci, 2004, p. 351). 
In contrast to Russia’s sources of hard power, which include oil sanc-
tions, gas isolation, and superiority in nuclear energy, they have also used 
soft power as a means of creating influence. According to the definition of 
soft power put forth by Joseph Nye (in Grigas, 2012, p. 8), “[soft power] is 
the ability to attract based on a state’s culture, political values and foreign 
policy, which must be perceived as legitimate and having moral authority.” 
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Another definition stipulates that soft power is a way of influencing policy 
decisions of a nation based off of their ability to create a “long-term rela-
tionship.” In the context of Russia and the Baltic States, Russia has used 
soft power in a number of ways, but the most notable is their advocacy for 
the minority of ethnic Russians, which has increased the appeal of Russian 
culture among non-ethnic Russians. Russia has been quite successful in 
this regard, through the creation of Russian advocacy groups located in 
all three states. The most notable of these groups are the Harmony Cen-
tre, which is a pro-Russian political party, and the House of Moscow, in 
Latvia. The purpose of the House of Moscow is to promote Russian cul-
ture, not only to ethnic Russians but also to ethnic Latvians. Another way 
that Russia seeks to promote Russian culture is by encouraging athletes 
in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to come to Russia, where they can earn 
much higher wages (Grigas, 2012). Additionally, Russia seeks to increase 
awareness of Russian culture by offering scholarships to students in these 
countries, though this method is much less successful, as many students 
decide to study at home or in other universities in Europe. According to 
Grigas (2012), one of the most invasive methods that Russia has imple-
mented in the last decade is by offering ethnic Russians automatic Russian 
citizenship. However, despite the efforts of Russian authorities to import 
Russian culture to the Baltic countries to create a base of power as means 
of increasing influence, they have been less successful than before. In the 
last decade fewer students have been selecting Russia as their second lan-
guage, opting instead to study German, French or English (Grigas, 2012).
Russia has implemented soft power in the Baltics through the impor-
tation of Russian business culture to the region. Russia has accomplished 
this goal through creating Russian-friendly contacts over the last twenty 
years. By tying in the motives of the business and political elites, Russia 
has been able to influence the policy decisions at the top (Wood, 2012). 
One example that testifies to this result is the case in Estonia, in which the 
mayor of Tallinn was charged with accepting 1.5 million Euros to finance 
Russian Railways (Grigas, 2012). This incident, along with others that are 
undocumented serve to show the extent to which Russian businesses have 
been able to influence Baltic policy makers through bribes.
In sum, Russia’s use of soft power often blends together with its hard 
power, making it difficult to consider Russia’s soft power “moral.” Accord-
ing to Wood (2012), Russia’s ability to influence its neighbors through soft 
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power is also affected through conditions at home that are not prime for 
investment. To counter the lack of investment at home, Russia attempts to 
implement soft power and hard power that aims at influencing the policy 
of their neighbors.
The Russian government uses both soft and hard power to achieve 
influence in the Baltic countries. This reflects what many consider Rus-
sia’s desire to restore the power it had under the Soviet Union. Russia 
has an advantage over their Baltic neighbors stemming from their signif-
icant energy resources and their ability to extract them with their greater 
financial resources. Another reason that Russia has been able to influence 
their neighbors is that the infrastructure of oil pipelines and gas and elec-
tric grids, inherited from the Soviet Union, connect the Baltic States only 
to Russia. However, conditions within the Baltic States themselves also 
enable Russia’s ability to influence Baltic policy. The Baltic countries’ gov-
ernments are corrupt and slow moving, which prevents the completion of 
projects that would help to alleviate themselves from the Russian yoke. 
However, underlying structural flaws in the government that have been 
created through the fragmentation and commercialization of politics cause 
the corruption and ineffectiveness of government. The high levels of Rus-
sian minorities in the Baltics allow Russia to exploit their influence and 
be used as source of soft power. Finally, Russia is able to influence these 
countries to a high degree because they have something the Baltic coun-
tries need: energy. Without the huge amount of energy natural resources 
Russia owns it would be impossible for Russia to have the degree of influ-
ence they have among their neighbors. This would not be possible without 
their ability to capitalize on weaknesses and take advantage of Soviet-era 
infrastructure. Until the Baltic countries are able to solve their weaknesses 
and cooperate to build better linkages with the European Union, it will be 
impossible to escape Russian influence.
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